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Response to Reverend William Schweiker
BY HEATHER ELLIOTT+
The textbook that I use to teach environmental law contains a chapter on what is
known as the Public Trust doctrine.' In order to better describe this doctrine the
authors give the following example. Imagine that a research scientist, who sets out to
find the oldest living thing on Earth, concludes that the Bristle Cone Pine tree is the
most likely candidate. Unfortunately, his mission pre-dates modem microscopic
coring tools, so to determine the tree's age-and with the permission of the
government official in charge of the forest-he cuts the tree down and counts its rings
in the cross section. He finds that when he killed it, it was 4,990 years old. In fact,
this is not just a hypothetical; there was indeed such an event in the 1930s. The
example concludes by asking: "Did you feel something move in the pit of your
stomach from the death of, what they call, the Methuselah tree?"'2 My students
invariably reply that they experience that feeling in the pit of their stomachs, just as I
also do. This is likely the result of a shared intuitive sense that the Methuselah tree
was worthy because it was there-because it survived for that long. We are all left
with the unmistakable impression that we should choose not to hurt it precisely
because we are able to so choose.
The Public Trust doctrine is one of the few legal doctrines that gives us a hook on
which to hang action and conformity with these intuitions, but it is famously nebulous3
to the extent that cases involving virtually the same facts come out in opposite ways.
The intuition that we should save the Methuselah tree because it is there, and because
we can, stops well short of allowing for accurate predictions of a consistent course of
action. It is in drawing out the meaning of this intuition that I find Professor
Schweiker's analysis valuable. Certainly, he takes an important step by reconciling
the anthropocentric and ecocentric approaches to environmental problems. In doing
so he attempts to bridge a divide that has produced a number of fruitless disputes over
the recent decades; indeed, arguments over how to reconcile our existence as both
biological entities and moral agents has brought about the death of a notable number

+ Assistant Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law.
I ROBERT H. ABRAMS ET AL., ENvIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 1065-

66 (3d ed. 2004).
2 Id. at 1066.
3 Compare Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988) (ruling that the bodies of water at
issue, which all involved parties agreed was so shallow as to render them non-navigable, fell within the
scope of the public trust doctrine by virtue of the fact that they were indirectly subject to the influence of
the tides), with United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935) (finding an area of water that is rarely more than
four feet deep, choked with mud and vegetation, bound by ice for three to four months of the year, and
almost entirely dry during the summer to be non-navigable and therefore not within the scope of the public
trust doctrine).
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of trees. But more importantly, he has started to define a means of giving moral heft
to our intuitions regarding ecological problems.
As Professor Schweiker explains, ecological rationality dictates that we should not,
and indeed cannot, separate ourselves from the ecology that supports us because to do
so misunderstands the nature of the problem that confronts us. 4 Such ecological
rationality is a necessary step in supporting what we intuitively know to be true:
human beings are not the only living things that deserve consideration in our moral
calculus. However, he notes, rationality such as this may weaken our ability to stake
moral claims upon ourselves. For Professor Schweiker, this means that a necessary
element of any ecological ethic is a cogent analysis of who can take moral action.
The logic of agential reasoning gives us the tool to perform that analysis-to decide
who can be held responsible for environmental harms. But who can enforce that
liability when many environmental harms are so broad in scope and so protracted in
time that we are almost unable to comprehend them? In the Global Age, if we cannot
obtain this kind of accountability-which becomes particularly important when
considering the question of God's judgment in the next world-how can we make
agents responsible for environmental harms? Professor Schweiker's answer is that we
must combine the ecological and agential rationalities into a theory that accounts for
without overlooking the ability of
the complex responsiveness of ecological systems
5
agents to make choices within those systems.
This is a valuable contribution to a literature of environmental ethics that tends to
fall victim to a totalizing instinct: either humans are the only concern or ecology is.
Each approach fails to provide a workable ethic. By emphasizing that both the
ecological and the agential rationalities are subsets of the larger inquiry and that one
not need choose between the two--indeed, one cannot choose between the twoProfessor Schweiker moves us beyond a frustrating impasse. As he said, "complexity
goes all the way down." 6 However, as a lawyer, I am interested in the applied aspect
of this ethic, and in that sense I am not sure how much further along we are than when
we started, particularly if our purpose is creating an ethic that will foster choices
addressing ecological harm. I am certain that we have a more nuanced account of
why nonhuman entities deserve moral consideration: Not simply because they are
there, but because of the reflexive rationality that consideration of our planetary
system demands. I am also certain that we have a more nuanced explanation for how
accountability can be ascribed to nonhuman actors, although as a lawyer I am used to
having courts assign such responsibility without much theoretical grounding. But I
see great things ahead as we begin to try to answer the next questions: How do these
principles combine to produce moral directives in particular situations?; How does
this theory start to resolve the endless competing arguments that environmental
problems raise? That being said, I am forced to acknowledge that, just as the Public
4 Reverend William Schweiker, Global Problems, Global Responsibilities: Accepting and Assigning
Liabilitiesfor Environmental Harms, ante, pp. 348-49.
5 Id.at 347.
6 Id. at 346.
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Trust doctrine shows great promise but remains a challenging tool to use due to its
uncertainty, I find myself uncertain of where we go from here.
Perhaps my ultimate question is: "How would this ethic rule on the Methuselah
tree, and if there were other such trees, does it matter that this one was cut down?" If
no, what of our intuition that it was wrong regardless? Is it the frivolity of cutting it
down just to see how old it is? The scientist who cuts the tree down and the
government official who approved the cutting are clearly moral agents. Does it matter
if the scientist works for Exxon or for the University of California? Does it matter if
the official's government is democratic or totalitarian? Why even care about the
Methuselah tree? As Professor Schweiker has argued, life qua life is not the moral
goal, but the integrity of life more generally. 7 Yet still there is that feeling, that
intuition, in the pit of our stomachs, or at least in the pit of my stomach, that the
Methuselah tree is, and because it has survived, we should protect it if we can. If an
ecological ethic cannot vindicate that intuition, perhaps it is not the ethic we need.

7Id. at 358.

